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I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD LEROY JONES, ) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
- v s . - ) 
SAMUEL W. SMITH, Warden ) Case No* 14277 
Utah State Prison, 
Defendant-Resondent* 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
- v s . - ) 
RICHARD LEROY JONES, ) Case No. 14280 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
BRIEF OF ... APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This i s an appeal from a judgment and order entered by the Honorable 
Stewart M. Hanson, Judge of the Ihird Judicial D i s t r i c t Court, denying 
pet i t ioner-appel lant ' s Motion for a New Trial and dismissing pe t i t ioner -
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appel lant ' s pe t i t ion for Writ of Habeas Corpus upon the merits, 
on September 2, 1975* 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable 
Stewart M# Hanson, Judge of the Ihird Judicial Court, on August 21, 
1975* After hearing, Judge Hanson issued an Order denying pet i t ioner-
a p p e l l a n t s Motion for a New Trial and Pet i t ion for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus upon the merits thereof* 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court ' s judgement and order 
denying petitiner-appellant& Motion for a New Trial and dismissing 
a p p e l l a n t s Pet i t ion for Writ of Habeas Corpus upon the merits # 
Appellant further seeks and Order of th is court granting pe t i t i one r ' s 
Pet i t ion and releasing pe t i t ioner , or , in the a l t e rna t ive , granting 
pet i t ioner a new t r i a l from his conviction in the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant Richard LeRoy Jones was charged by Information before the 
Honorable D. Prank Wilkins, Di s t r i c t Judge, Ihird Judicial Court, with 
the crime of "Robbery" in violat ion of Section, 76-6-301, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953)• 
At t r i a l in the matter, the only testimony presented linking the 
defendant-appellant to the alleged offense was the testimony of one 
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Terry Shannon Adams, the alleged victim of the Robbery and a thr ice 
convicted Felon. Mr. Adams tes t i f ied that Mr. Jones, the defendant, 
had robbed him of some $300.00 a t gun point on the 1st day of September, 
1973^ (Tr. I , p . l 0 , e t . s e q . ) . No other witness observed the alleged 
crime. No weapon was ever recovered or identifed as having been the 
weapon employed in the alleged crime* The money allegedly taken was 
never recovered. No other substant ia l evidence was adduced linking the 
defendant-appellant to the alleged crime. (Tr. I , R . ) . 
At t r i a l , pe t i t ioner-appel lant ' s court-appointed counsel did not 
object to or move to s t r ike witness testimony regarding certain weapons 
seized a t an apartment consti tuting the abode of a friend and received 
into evidence a t t r i a l of pe t i t ioner in the matter, even though grounds for 
such objection existed in that such weapons were not shown to be related 
to the offense with which pet i t ioner was charged and in that such evidence 
was highly inflammatory and pre judic ia l . (Tr. I , p.27*et. seq.)(Tr . I I , 
p.26, pp.21-22). Further, defendant's counsel fai led to properly prepare 
for t r i a l of the matter in that he fai led to interview pet i t ioner pre-
cedent to t r i a l and during t r i a l in regard to information that he might 
have presented necessary and valuable to pet i t ioners defense. (Tr. I I , 
p .4 , pp. 19-20). In addit ion, defendant's counsel fai led to present a timely 
appeal in the matter although substant ial grounds for appeal presented 
themselves a t t r i a l and although defense counsel advised pe t i t ioner 
tha t such appeal would be timely f i l ed . 
Appellant was subsequently t r ied to a jury before the court on the 
charge of "Robbery" and on November 27, 1973* the jury found appellant 
gu i l ty of the charged offense of "Robbery" under the above cited Section, 
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and a judgment and conviction for that offense was subsequently 
entered by Judge Wilkins. 
On November 27* 1973# appellant was sentenced by Judge Wilkins 
to serve an indeterminate term in the Utah State Penitentiary* No 
appeal was f i l e d in the matter. 
In May, 1975$ pet i t ioner-appel lant f i l e d a Pet i t ion for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus in the Third Judicial D i s t r i c t Court, Sa l t Lake County, 
State of Utah, a l l eg ing that the evidence presented a t t r i a l was in -
s u f f i c i e n t as a matter of law to support p e t i t i o n e r ' s conviction and 
that defendant-petit ioner was denied a t t r i a l the r i g h t to the e f f ec t ive 
ass i s tance of counsel in the preparation and presentation of his defense* 
Upon hearing thereon, Judge Stewart M» Hanson, Sr#, D i s t r i c t Judge of 
the Third Judicial D i s t r i c t Court, by order denied a Motion for New 
Trial previously f i l e d in the matter and dismissed pet i t ioner-appel lant*s 
Pet i t ion on the merits• From that judgment and order of dismissal app-
e l l a n t brings th is d i r e c t appeal• 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT PETITIONER'S MOTION 
FOR A NEW TRIAL AND PETITIONERfS PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS 
CORPUS SINCE THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS LEGALLY I N -
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT PETITIONER'S CONVICTION 
I t i s well established as a matter of law that the evidence pre-
sented a t t r i a l in a criminal case must be s u f f i c i e n t to support a 
f inding by the t r i e r of Fact beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime 
_ i i 
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in question was committed by the defendant. State v. Hickam, 95 Mo 
322, 8 SW 252; Schultz v. State, 88 Neb 613, 130 NW 105; State v. 
Lapointe, 81 NH 227, 123 A 692; State v. Bartlett, kj NH 224; State 
v. Falkner, 182 NG 793t 108 SE 756, (See also 30 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, 
^ 1170 et. seq.). 
Ihe above set forth proposition is perhaps so universally recog-
nized that a recitation of the numerous cases sustaining it is unneces-
sary. The principle is recounted in 30 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, at 
1170, as follows: 
In a criminal prosecution, in order to warrant a conviction, 
the prosecution is required, in the discharge of the burden 
imposed upon it of establishing by proof all the essential 
elements of the crime with which the defendant is charged in 
the indictment, to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the accused is guilty of that crime, and in the absence of such 
a degree of proof of the defendant's guilt, he is entitled to 
an acquittal . . . It is not sufficient that the preponderance 
or the weight of the evidence point to the guilt of the accused, 
nor can the accused be convicted on general principles or on 
mere suspicion. This rule is obviously based upon broad princi-
ples of humanity, which forbid the infliction of punishment un-
til the commission of the crime is to a reasonable certainty 
established. It has received the sanction of the most enlight-
ened jurists in all civilized communities, and in all ages; and 
with the increasing regard for human life and individual security, 
it is quite apparent that the energy of the rule is in no degree 
impaired* 
Applying the rationale of the above cited cases and authority to 
the facts in the instant case, it is clear that the evidence presented 
at trial in the instant case was legally insufficient under the above 
set forth standard. Accordingly, not only did the jury err in ariving 
at a verdict of guilty in the original proceeding, but the trial court 
erred in failing to grant appellant's petition for a Writ of Habeas 
Corpus herein and his Motion for a New Trial. 
-5-
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In this case the only direct evidence of the alleged Robbery 
heard by the jury herein was the testimony of Terry Shannon Adams, 
a thrice convicted Felon, . Mr. Adams testified that Mr. Jones 
had robbed him at gunpoint on the 1st day of September , 19?S* No 
other witnesses observed the alleged robbery. No weapons were ever 
found or identified as having been the weapon employed by defendant in 
perpetrating the crime. No money was ever found on the defendant^ 
person or at his place of residence. In short, the only evidence link-
ing Mr. Jones to the crime was the testimony of the thrice convicted 
Felon, Mr. Adams, which the defendant strongly repudiated. It is 
defendants contention that such testimonial evidence, devoid as it 
was of any supportive evidence, was insufficient to support the 
Robbery Charge under the standards set forth in the above cited cases 
and authority. 
From the above, it should be clear that the jury, in convicting 
appellant of the crime of Robbery, chose clearly to ignore the man-
date of the law that defendants quilt be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Further, the trial judge erred in refusing to grant either 
appellants Motion for a New Trial or Appellant^ Petition for Wtit of 
Habeas Corpus. This Court should reverse the decision of the jury and 
the trial court and remand this case to the District Court for retrial. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 10 GRANT PETITIONERS MOTION 
FOR A NEW TRIAL, AND PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS 
CORPUS SINCE PETITIONER WAS DENIED AT TRIAL THE RIGHT TO THE 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN THE PREPARATION AND PRESENTA-
TION OF HIS DEFENSE 
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It is well established as a matter of law that the defendant 
in a criminal proceeding is entitled to have the aid of effective 
counsel in his defense. Jaramillo v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 19* 465 
P. 2d 343 (1970); Allres v. Turner. 22 Utah 2d 118, 449 P- 2d 241 
(1969); People v. Seger, 405 111. 222, 90 N.E. 2d 637 (1950); People 
v* Hughes, 57 Gal 2d 89, 3^ 7 P* 2d 33 (I96I); People v. DeSimone, 
9 111. 2d 522, 138 N.E. 2d 556. (See also the cases collected under 
157 A.L.R. 1226). 
In this jurisdiction, the standard for competent counsel is 
enunciated in Alires v. Turner, supra, wherein Justice Grodkett 
said: 
The (due process) requirement (of counsel) is not sa t i s f ied 
by a sham or pretense of an appearance in the record by an 
attorney who manifests no real concern about the in teres ts 
of the accused. (449 P* 2d a t 243). 
Similarly, in Jaramillo v. Turner, supra, this court sa id: 
(an al legat ion of incompetent counsel only a r i ses when) • • . 
there has been such a flagrant abuse of legal procedure as to 
amount to bad fa i th on the past of the lawyer. (24 Utah 2d a t 
22). 
Applying the ra t ionale of the above cited cases and author i t ies 
to the facts in the ins tant case, i t i s clear that the above s e t 
forth requirements of due process have not been sa t i s f ied in the 
ins tant case, and that the pet i t ioner-appel lant fs defense was 
nothing more than a sham and bad fa i th pretense of defense presented 
by an attorney unwilling to venture even a minimal effort on his c l i en t ' s 
behalf. Ihis conclusion i s borne out by the following facts brought 
to l i gh t in the Habeas Corpus proceeding from which this Appeal is 
brought: 
!• Pet i t ioner-Appel lants court-appointed counsel did not object 
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or move to strike witness testimony regarding certain weapons seized 
at an apartment constituting the abode of a friend and received into 
evidence at trial of petitioner in the matter, ever though grounds 
for such objection existed in that such weapons were not shown to 
be related to the offense with which petitioner was charged and in 
that such evidence was highly inflammatory and prejudicial* (ir. I, 
p. 27iet. seq. Tr. II, p. 6, pp. 21-22). 
2. Defendants counsel failed to properly prepare for trial of 
the matter in that he failed to interview petitioner precedent to 
trial and during trial in regard to information that he might have 
presented necessary and valuable to petitioners defense, (it. II, 
p. 4, pp. 19-20). 
3« Defendant's counsel failed to present timely appeal in the 
matter although substantial grounds for appeal presented themselves at 
trial and although defense counsel advised petitioner that such appeal 
would be timely filed. (Tr. II, p. 2k). 
Prom the above recited points it should be immediately apparent 
that defendant was denied at trial his right to the assistance of 
effective counsel in the preparation and presentation of his defense. 
As noted above, defendants court-appointed counsel failed in several 
particulars to properly represent defendant at trial in the matter. 
The cumulative effect of these four errors of omission was, we contend, 
to render the trial a sham and pretense of appearance by an attorney 
who manifested no real concern for the interests of the accused. Ihis 
court should reverse the decision of the trial court denying petitionerfs 
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Motion for a New Trial and dismissing pe t i t ione r ' s Pet i t ion for Writ 
of Habeas Corpus, and e i ther remand this matter for a new t r i a l or , 
in the a l t e rna t ive , order peti t ioner*s immediate re lease . 
CONCLUSION 
The t r i a l court erred in dismissing the a p p e l l a n t s Motion for a 
New Trial and appellant fs Writ of Habeas Corpus since the evidence 
adduced a t t r i a l was legal ly insufficient to support appel lant fs 
conviction and since appellant was denied a t t r i a l the r igh t to the 
effective assistance of counsel in the preparation and presentation 
of his defense* Ihis court should reverse the rul ing and judgment of 
the t r i a l court and ei ther order a p p e l l a n t s immediate release or, 
CO 
in the a l te rna t ive , order a new t r i a l for appellant* 
Respectfully submitted, 
)M JONES 
263 South S3&3nd East 
Sa l t Lake Ci-^yT 
Appelllant 
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